Establishing a service channel: a transaction cost analysis of a channel contract between a cruise line and a tour operator by Ng, Irene C. L.
0 
ESTABLISHING A SERVICE CHANNEL: A TRANSACTION COST ANALYSIS 
OF A CHANNEL CONTRACT BETWEEN A CRUISE LINE AND A TOUR 
OPERATOR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Irene C.L. Ng, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
29 March 2005 
Forthcoming in the Journal of Services Marketing, Volume 21, No. 7, (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
Irene Ng is Lecturer in Marketing at the School of Business and Economics, 
University of Exeter (U.K.),   
 
Contact Information: School of Business and Economics, University of Exeter, 
Streatham Court, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4PU, United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0) 
1392 263250, Fax: +44 (0) 1392 263242, Email: irene.ng@exeter.ac.uk 
 
 
Ng, Irene C.L. (2006), “Establishing a Service Channel: A Transaction Cost Analysis of a Channel Contract between a 
Cruise Line and a Tour Operator,” Journal Of Services Marketing, Volume 21, No. 7 
 
1 
ESTABLISHING A SERVICE 
CHANNEL: A TRANSACTION COST 
ANALYSIS OF A CHANNEL 
CONTRACT BETWEEN A CRUISE 
LINE AND A TOUR OPERATOR 
 
ABSTRACT 
Services marketing literature 
treats the distribution of services as 
distributing service delivery, as opposed 
to service sales. Yet, many services are 
not delivered at the time of the sale, and 
the firm is selling a promise that the 
service will be delivered at some future 
time. This paper shows that this 
advanced selling has serious transaction 
cost implications to the firm and a 
potential intermediary.  
Through a case study, and using 
a transaction cost approach, a contract 
between a cruise line and a tour operator 
is analyzed. The results show that 
service intermediaries aren’t able to take 
inventory and are unable to demonstrate 
their commitment. Consequently, both 
parties would be unwilling to establish a 
contract. However, commitment can be 
achieved through the intermediary 
investing in relationship-specific assets 
that it could recover, subject to 
performance. Similarly, the firm could 
pledge its capacity for its investment in 
the specific assets. Such a mechanism 
aligns the interests of both.  
 
Keywords: Services, Transaction cost, 
Distribution, Advanced Selling, Tourism, 
Asia 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Traditionally, literature on 
transaction costs and channel 
contracts have focused on firms 
dealing with goods. Little attention has 
been devoted to the analysis of 
channel contracts between service 
firms and their intermediaries, as well 
as the issues faced by the parties. 
Although service firms face similar 
transaction cost problems, the unique 
characteristics of services serve to 
amplify the problems further.  
 In order to better understand 
service channel contracts, this paper 
will study a particular contract between 
an Asian cruise operator and a tour 
operator through archival records. This 
channel contract is interesting for a few 
reasons. First, it highlights the practical 
as well as theoretical difficulties 
encountered in contracting between a 
service firm and its intermediary. 
Second, it shows how the threat of 
potential opportunistic behavior of 
service intermediaries can be reduced 
even though, as a service 
intermediary, it is not able to hold 
inventory. Third, the firm, as a single-
vessel cruise operator, is a small-to-
medium enterprise (SME), and is thus 
limited in resources as well as its 
choice of governance structure. The 
channel contract and the procedures 
embedded within, illustrate how 
service capacity can be used to 
augment a SME’s limited resources. In 
addition, the paper shows how the 
SME installed various control 
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mechanisms into the contract to 
reduce potential opportunism and 
perceived purchase risk by its 
intermediaries. Finally, the strategically 
designed contract can even gain 
intermediaries’ commitment to 
accelerate market development efforts. 
 The paper begins by conducting 
a literature review on transaction cost 
theory and its implications in the 
service context. The industry overview 
and the profile of Asiatic Cruise Line 
follows. The channel contract is then 
presented, together with analyses of 
some of the features in the contract. 
The paper concludes with some 
summary remarks. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The study of channel design 
and contracts is historically rooted in 
transaction cost theory, following the 
literature inspired by Coase (1937) 
and further developed by Williamson 
(1989). The general problem 
addressed is how to conduct 
exchange between channel members 
whose objectives are only partially 
convergent (Bergen, Dutta and 
Walker, 1992; Ouchi, 1979).  
According to transaction cost 
economics (TCE) literature, the 
criterion for efficient channel design 
and contracts is to minimize 
transaction costs (i.e. the intangible 
costs of running and managing a 
channel) (cf. Bello and Lohtia, 1995). 
Such costs arise from impediments in 
reaching and enforcing agreements 
within a channel and are associated 
with activities such as bargaining, 
contracting, monitoring performance, 
and activities that are not directly 
productive but which are engaged in 
only as a consequence of a need to 
coordinate activities among 
transactions. Transaction costs also 
include the cost of acquiring market 
information; costs arising from 
environmental uncertainty, and 
particularly for this paper, the cost of 
opportunism (see Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997 for a good review on 
transaction cost analysis). This 
means that if the optimal choice of a 
channel contract has been 
established with an independent 
agent, often involving relationship-
specific investments, parties may act 
opportunistically after the contract has 
been formed (Joskow, 1987). 
Opportunistic behavior can 
manifest itself in two forms (Masten, 
1996). The first type of opportunism 
usually entails a transgressor using 
certain ‘loopholes’ within a contract in 
such a way that does not actually 
breach the terms of the contract, but 
to take advantage of terms in the 
contract that are ill defined or difficult 
to enforce. Such behavior, considered 
a moral hazard to economists, often 
exploits the fact that the cost of 
maintaining the contract to the other 
party, even with the transgression, is 
lower than not having the contract at 
all (cf. Masten, 1996). 
The second form of 
opportunism arises from the fact that 
when an initial contract with certain 
specific investments that bind parties 
are in force, the party who perceives 
himself in a stronger position may 
renegotiate the terms in such a way 
that holds the other party “ransom” 
(Masten, 1996; Williamson, 1985). 
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Notwithstanding the hazards of 
contracting and the imperfections in 
the ability of parties to protect 
themselves, channel contracts with 
independent middlemen still 
represent the norm in global trade 
(Bello and Lohtia, 1995). This is 
because the use of non-integrated 
channels (independent agents or 
distributors) often provides a relatively 
easier mode of entry into a foreign 
market (Root, 1987). These 
intermediaries possess strong 
knowledge of the local market and 
are able to provide sophisticated 
marketing services (Clasen, 1991). 
Given the potential 
opportunism threat, establishing 
efficient channel contracts for goods 
firms pose a challenge in itself and 
academic literature has dealt with it 
extensively. Indeed, normative 
research on channels and transaction 
cost economics has concentrated on 
goods firms. Little academic attention 
has been devoted to the development 
of service channels contracts. This is 
despite some TCE studies showing 
that international entry mode choice 
are affected differently for goods and 
service firms in transaction cost 
theory (Erramilli and Rao, 1993; 
Murray and Kotabe, 1999). Perhaps 
the reason for this is because the 
unique characteristics of services - its 
intangibility, inseparability, 
perishability and heterogeneity - 
make it difficult to relate to how the 
"distribution" of a service can be 
accomplished (Light, 1986). Hence, 
there are currently very few studies 
exploring the specificities of services 
and synthesizing them with 
transaction cost economics especially 
with regard to the process of how 
service contracts are established. 
Compounding this difficulty is the 
likelihood that obtaining data on 
contracts a deliberation is small, as 
they tend to be confidential and 
sensitive. Yet, this synthesis is 
necessary because while 
conventional service literature informs 
us that services exhibit unique 
characteristics, such descriptions 
would not be useful unless translated 
into some meaningful insights that 
assist firms in contractual decisions. 
The intangibility of a service 
create problems for the marketer as 
not only potential buyers are not able 
to see or touch it before consumption, 
channel intermediaries may also not 
be able to convey the idea and the 
quality of the service to the consumer 
satisfactorily. The role of channel 
intermediaries in selling services 
therefore tends to be more 
complicated than the physical 
distribution of goods. As Stone (1990, 
pg. 80) puts it, "How can you rely on 
the agency to position your product 
properly, particularly when 
perceptions and promise are the 
essence of selling?" 
The inseparability of many 
services from production and 
consumption may imply that direct 
sale is the only option and channel 
intermediaries are not required. 
Regrettably, such an option will 
severely limit the service firm's ability 
to market its service offerings 
elsewhere. To overcome this 
limitation, many tourism services 
distribute a tangible representation of 
the service (Ng, Wirtz and Lee, 1999). 
In this respect, channel intermediaries 
 
 
Ng, Irene C.L. (2006), “Establishing a Service Channel: A Transaction Cost Analysis of a Channel Contract between a 
Cruise Line and a Tour Operator,” Journal Of Services Marketing, Volume 21, No. 7 
 
3 
often do not distribute the actual 
service but a tangible representation 
of a promise that the service will 
become available for consumption at 
some future time or date, such as that 
of an airline ticket, a hotel voucher, 
meal coupons or a cruise ticket. 
Transaction cost implications on the 
distribution of a promise has still not 
been adequately dealt with in 
academic literature. 
The heterogeneity of services 
often results in the lack of 
standardization in the service delivery 
process. This may sometimes result 
in dissatisfied customers and thus 
strain the relationship between 
independent channel intermediaries 
and the service firm. Consequently, 
many service firms resort to vertical 
integration to solve the marketing 
problem (Seaton and Bennett, 1996). 
However, due to the intangibility of 
services, perceived risk of purchase 
is higher (Murray and Schachter, 
1990). To reduce that risk, consumers 
usually look for more information 
(Lutz and Reilly, 1973). This is usually 
the case for tourism services where 
the agent’s role is to provide 
customers with sufficient information 
to facilitate travel purchase decisions 
(Seaton and Bennett, 1996). In this 
respect, when a vertically integrated 
channel is used to communicate with 
customers, the information can be 
perceived as biased and customers 
may choose not to purchase from the 
intermediary concerned (Seaton and 
Bennett, 1996). Accordingly, the use 
of independent intermediaries still 
prevails in the marketplace. 
Perishability of services also 
creates potential problems. In the 
effort to maximize yield and reduce 
unused capacity, many service firms 
sell in advance (Ng, 2004). By price 
discriminating through advanced 
selling, firms practice yield 
management with time-based pricing 
and even overbooking (Lee and Ng, 
2001). Channel intermediaries may 
find that the service may not be 
available at certain times and prices 
may vary, resulting in confusion, 
repeated bargaining and therefore 
higher transaction costs for channel 
participants and the service provider.  
Similar to a goods firm, the 
central issue to the contracting 
difficulties between a service firm and 
its agent is also brought about by 
potential intermediary opportunism. 
(Light, 1986; Stone, 1990). However, 
the threat of potential intermediary 
opportunism is greatly enhanced for 
services due to several reasons. First, 
since services are inseparable, many 
firms have taken to distributing 
promises. This means that 
intermediaries run a risk that a 
promise may not be fulfilled by the 
firm, for reasons that may or may not 
be within the principal's control. 
Second, because of the heterogeneity 
of services, channel intermediaries 
also have to face some uncertainty 
with regards to the quality of the 
service delivered. Such uncertainties 
weigh heavily on the channel 
contracts primarily due to bounded 
rationality. 
Bounded rationality refers to 
the fact that although individuals act 
in a rational manner, their rationality 
is bounded by their limited 
understanding of the issues involved, 
the inability to foresee the future, the 
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insufficient expertise in the matter 
and/or a high cost of time (search 
costs) (Simon, 1957, 1961). Bounded 
rationality therefore prevents a 
contract from being complete, since 
contracting parties are not able to 
foresee all future events, nor are they 
able to provide for them in the 
contract. Where bounded rationality 
exists amongst the contracting 
parties, greater uncertainty increases 
the fear of opportunistic behavior and 
thus undermines the ability of parties 
to write more efficient contracts (Bello 
and Lohtia, 1995; Williamson, 1991).  
While service intermediaries 
can claim to have higher risks in 
selling services because of the 
heterogeneity and perishability 
problem, these may be partially 
resolved by the service firm through a 
reputation of good quality (reduced 
risk with heterogeneity) and providing 
guarantees that a promise of a 
service will be delivered. 
The more severe problem 
arises from the intangibility and the 
inseparability of services as these 
characteristics result in the 
intermediaries themselves being 
unable to hold inventory as a 
demonstration of their commitment 
(see Bateson, 1995). Where there are 
contractual obligations to ensure the 
fulfillment of a promise (e.g. a ticket 
or a voucher) and reasonable 
reputation to ensure satisfactory 
service quality, the burden of risk in 
the channel contract becomes 
asymmetrical. Service firms often 
hold almost all of the financial risk in 
ensuring that a service is delivered. 
This is unlike their counterparts in 
goods where many retailers assume 
some part of the risks by taking in 
stock (Goodall and Ashworth, 1988; 
Middleton, 1994).  
The inability of a service 
intermediary to hold inventory has 
severe transaction cost implications. 
It is apparent that the intermediary is 
unable to provide a credible 
commitment to a service firm as an 
assurance of its ability to expend 
significant marketing efforts to 
promote its service (often, to obtain 
higher margins). This inability results 
in intermediaries having no incentives 
to stay committed to a particular 
service provider (cf. Seaton and 
Bennett, 1996). Consequently, the 
service firm is less likely to invest in 
any relationship-specific assets and 
the fear of potential opportunistic 
behavior becomes omnipotent in 
negotiating channel contracts. 
Such fear of opportunistic 
behavior is evident in the tourism 
industry where through analyzing this 
case, the hotels commonly issue 
contracted rates for their rooms to 
multiple agents (and often multiple 
rates too) without much commitment 
from agents in return. Consequently, 
agents sell on an as-and-when-there-
are-enquiries basis, and often do not 
go out of their way to aggressively 
promote the tourism product. 
Although the lack of commitment from 
both parties serves to reduce the 
transaction costs from potential 
opportunism, it is highly inefficient 
and unproductive and usually 
impedes market development for 
many tourism service offerings.  
Opportunistic behavior is 
therefore costly. To the extent that 
parties can try to devise contracts that 
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reduce the probability or costs of 
conflicts, the gains available to 
redistribute between them rise 
tremendously (Jeuland and Shugan, 
1983). However, the problem to 
constrain opportunism places great 
demands on bounded rationality 
(Williamson, 1985).  
From this study, it was found 
that many tourism service firms take 
the path of least resistance – by not 
committing to any binding contract 
seems more prudent than to be a 
victim of an opportunistic agent. 
Without a credible commitment, many 
principals do not feel assured to 
invest in assets required in building 
the channel relationship, as it 
believes the agent will act 
opportunistically once the market is 
established. This is particularly so for 
SMEs where resources are limited 
(Donald et al, 1991), as the potential 
backlash (opportunistic behavior of 
agents) further depletes resources.  
Paradoxically, the SMEs 
themselves have a greater need for 
channel intermediaries. This is 
because, given the resource 
disadvantage, many SMEs are 
unable to mount a large-scale market 
development exercise. To distribute 
their good or service, there is usually 
a heavier reliance on intermediaries. 
This reliance is even greater for 
tourism SMEs where the market is 
often found in the same geographical 
area. Furthermore, since resource 
limitation is a major problem for an 
SME, the choice of governance 
structure is likewise limited and 
vertical integration is often not an 
available option. 
Notwithstanding the challenges 
posed by the unique characteristics of 
services, independent service 
intermediaries do exist, especially in 
the marketing of tourism services. 
These intermediaries serve to fulfill 
the role of information providers, 
giving customers a host of purchase 
options in tourism services, mostly 
provided by other companies, and 
hence are often referred to as 'agents' 
(Foster, 1985; Burkart and Medlik, 
1981). Indeed, travel agents and tour 
operators in the tourism industry 
perform a major role in service 
distribution. For example, in the 
cruise industry in 1994, sales by 
travel agents and tour operators 
account for 97% of cruise sales 
onboard all ships (Godsman, 1994).  
The arrival of the Internet 
brought considerable changes in the 
way tourist products are marketed. 
Online activities now form part of 
many marketing activities conducted 
across multiple channels (Peterson, 
Balasubramamiam and Bronnenberg, 
1997). Many scholars have studied 
the advantages of the Internet for 
businesses (e.g. Verity and Hoff, 
1994; Qualch and Klein, 1996) and it 
was clear that it created access to 
segments that were poorly served 
before and also allowed businesses 
to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness. Indeed Pitt et al (1999) 
identified three effects of the Internet 
i.e. eliminate barriers cause by 
distance, allowing virtual businesses 
to operate 24 hours a day, 365 days a 
year, and making physical locations 
less relevant. As a result, there were 
compelling arguments for 
disintermediation, since the Internet is 
 
 
Ng, Irene C.L. (2006), “Establishing a Service Channel: A Transaction Cost Analysis of a Channel Contract between a 
Cruise Line and a Tour Operator,” Journal Of Services Marketing, Volume 21, No. 7 
 
6 
able to directly link customers and 
suppliers. Yet, it is becoming 
apparent that there exist many 
customers who do not want to deal 
with the problems of contacting 
multiple suppliers, and are prepared 
to pay for the expertise and 
convenience of travel agents and tour 
operators (Block and Segev, 1996). 
Furthermore, the Internet may not 
give the individual the best price, 
even if more reservations are 
undertaken through it, as the 
individual bargaining power is less 
than that of a consolidator such as a 
tour operator or travel agent (Bloch, 
et al, 1996; Wynne et. al, 2001). 
Thus, tour operators and travel 
agents who operate online, e.g. 
Expedia, Travelocity have better 
chances in terms of offering customer 
value online and would still be a force 
to reckon with in the future (Wynne et. 
al., 2001). Indeed, as online sales 
increase, tour operators’ bargaining 
powers are expected to become 
higher, thereby increasing the risk of 
opportunism. 
Extensions of Transaction 
Costs Economics (TCE) literature 
have advised contracting parties to 
deploy control mechanisms to 
manage contracting parties’ potential 
opportunistic behavior with the 
objective of reducing governance 
costs (Anderson, 1985; Heide and 
John, 1988; Klein, Frazier and Roth, 
1990; Lal, 1990). These include 
qualification procedures (Heide and 
John, 1990), credible commitments 
(Anderson and Weitz, 1992) and 
monitoring (Lal, 1990). However, 
within the context of services there is 
hardly any literature on how 
governance costs can be reduced, 
especially in light of the unique 
characteristics of services. While 
qualification and monitoring 
procedures can be put in place, the 
issue of credible commitment remains 
unresolved. 
This study analyzes a contract 
between a cruise line and a tour 
operator from archival records and 
structured interviews of the decision 
makers within the firms. Through this 
study, we offer a better understanding 
of the contracting difficulties 
examined in the literature review and 
offer possible solutions to the 
obstacles faced. Similar research has 
been conducted to better understand 
contracting decisions in services (e.g. 
Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999). 
However, contracts are often 
confidential and data from the 
deliberation process is often scant. 
Indeed, most studies would rely on 
the analysis of agreements (e.g. 
Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003) and 
draw conclusions based on the 
contractual choices. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The approach adopted was 
that of a case study through an 
analysis of minutes of meetings, 
archival notes, articles and reports by 
the firms’ executives, brochures, 
secondary reports and the actual 
contract between the two parties over 
the course of 1995. These documents 
were supplemented by interviews with 
the firms’ executives and the CEO of 
the firm.   Despite the progress of 
time, it is my opinion that many of the 
issues surrounding the situation then 
are still relevant today. The rationale 
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of the case study, therefore, is to 
analyze the contract, environment 
and decisions and draw out the 
theoretical issues surrounding the 
establishment of service channels. 
This case is viewed as a particularly 
strong manifestation of the issues and 
is therefore deemed worthy of study. 
Due to confidential agreements, the 
actual names of the parties cannot be 
divulged. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
INDUSTRY HISTORY 
At the time of this case (1995), 
global cruise industry statistics 
indicated that there were 123 ships in 
operation under the management of 
40 cruise lines. These totaled just 
over 100,000 beds a day and a 
passenger capacity of 5.428 million 
per year based on individual ship’s 
itineraries and schedules. Projected 
numbers showed that 1996 would see 
4.876 million passengers resulting in 
industry occupancy levels reaching 
close to 90% and an estimated sales 
revenue of USD10 billion 
(Anonymous, 1995).  With forecasted 
loads at close to 90%, major cruise 
operators were already making plans 
to increase supply of cruise berths.  
The strong growth of cruising 
passengers in North America created 
the feeling that the Caribbean was 
getting crowded (Frey-Gaynor, 1993). 
To diversify the number of cruise 
offerings, many North American 
cruise lines started to look at the Far 
East as a potential cruising region 
(Frey-Gaynor, 1993). Unlike the 
Caribbean cruise industry that held 
almost 67% of the market share in the 
total global cruise industry, the Far 
East (Asian Region) held only 2% 
(Anonymous, 1995). However, North 
American cruise lines that have 
already placed vessels in the Far 
East on a seasonal basis were 
starting to plan for a greater presence 
in this region by offering year-round 
cruise products (Frey-Gaynor, 1993, 
1995). Similarly, others who did not 
have any cruise itineraries in the Far 
East were also starting to plan in that 
direction. In addition, with growing 
affluence in Asia, many Asian 
consumers were looking at trying 
something new. Designing cruises 
that cater to the Asian market could 
therefore be a profitable niche.  
It was precisely this niche that 
prompted Lena Ho to form Asiatic 
Cruise Lines in December 1993, one 
of the first cruise lines in Southeast 
Asia to operate a vessel that caters to 
the Asian market on a year round 
basis.  
After Asiatic was formed, there 
was an impetus to establish a 
distribution network of agents. 
Through the agent network, the 
domestic market developed rapidly. 
By early 1995, cruise passenger 
turnover tripled and direct selling 
constituted 30% of sales with the 
other 70% sold through agents in 
Malaysia and Singapore. 
Lena Ho was not the only one 
intending to profit from the niche. 
Other operators had similar ideas. By 
1995, there were a total of 6 cruise 
operators, including Asiatic, catering 
to the regional markets of Southeast 
Asia (Ng, 1995b). These cruise 
operators, who were referred to as 
regional cruise operators (as a 
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distinction from the foreign cruise 
operators whose markets originated 
from either North America or Europe), 
contributed tremendously to the 
growth of the industry. Statistics 
released by the port authority in 
Singapore showed an increase of 
286% in terms of passenger numbers 
going through Singapore from 1993 to 
1994. Figures in Port Klang 
(Malaysia) also showed an increase 
of over 836% from 1992 to 1993 and 
86% from 1993 to 1994 (Ng, 1995a). 
The figures showed that some 74% of 
the passengers going through its port 
were passengers from Southeast 
Asia (Ng, 1995a). 
One of the reasons for the 
unprecedented growth in passenger 
numbers going through the Southeast 
Asian ports of Malaysia and 
Singapore was because the cruises 
offered by the regional cruise 
operators were shorter than those 
operated by their foreign 
counterparts. Consequently, the 
turnover of passengers over a given 
month was higher. The longest cruise 
offered to the regional markets was 
only 3 nights long, and although there 
were a few longer cruises offered, 
they were not popular. The most 
popular of the short cruises proved to 
be the overnight cruises, commonly 
called “Cruise-to-Nowhere”. These 
were popular because it was a 
sampling of how a regular cruise 
would be, and was therefore 
appealing to the Asian customers, 
many of whom had never cruised 
before. Also, a high proportion of 
cruise income from regional cruise 
operators was derived on board i.e. in 
the casino (Ferguson, 1997). Thus, a 
shorter cruise would enable a more 
frequent ‘turnover’ of customers and 
also reduce the impact of unsold 
capacity, since any excess capacity 
would be for the duration of one night 
only, instead of multiple nights. 
Like the other operators, 
Asiatic also operated short cruises 
catering to the regional markets of 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
Similar to the rest, the line depended 
a great deal on income from the 
casino. However, the company had a 
long-term plan to ensure a mix of both 
gaming passengers (a term used by 
the line for the segment of the market 
who was less interested to cruise 
than to play the tables in the casino) 
and tourists (the term for the segment 
that came on board to experience the 
cruise itself, with all its attractions on 
board).  
 
 
ASIATIC CRUISE LINE 
Asiatic Cruise Lines, a 
Malaysian company based in Kuala 
Lumpur, was a SME operating a 
single vessel cruising in the 
Southeast Asian waters. The long-
term plan of the company was to own 
a fleet of cruise vessels operating in 
Southeast Asia. Formed in December 
1993 by Lena Ho, Asiatic Cruise 
Lines and their 22 person team 
introduced their ship M/V “The Asian 
Princess” in May 1994. The vessel 
was chartered from a US based 
company with the intention to 
purchase her at a later date. She was 
approximately 8,500 tons, 140m long, 
able to cruise at a maximum speed of 
17 knots and was able to sleep 408 
passengers in 150 cabins. Classed by 
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Lloyds U.K., the vessel was built in 
1966 but was extensively refurbished 
over the years. Her facilities included 
a show lounge, karaoke lounge, 
disco, gift shop, photo shop, pool, hair 
salon (with massage services), kids 
play area, clinic/hospital and of 
course, the casino. The officers and 
crew made up the 205 crew 
contingent on board. The vessel’s 
home port was Port Klang in Malaysia 
although “The Asian Princess” called 
at various other ports of Penang 
(Northern Malaysia), Phuket 
(Thailand) and Langkawi (Northern 
Malaysia).  
Since Asiatic was a SME, its 
resources were limited and the 
company was not able to purchase 
sophisticated cruise reservation 
systems from established companies 
in the West. However, Asiatic Cruise 
Lines developed an in-house 
computerized cruise reservation 
system, with auto-ticketing, 
computerized fare codes to handle 
multi-tier fares, structured reporting 
and generation of passenger name 
references (PNRs).  
With a computerized 
reservation system, Asiatic was able 
to perform automatic and remote 
ticketing, control fares, provide 
automated reporting and adept at 
handling both bulk wholesale and 
retail reservations. It was through the 
development of this system that 
enabled Asiatic to penetrate the travel 
agent network and expand its 
distribution in Malaysia and 
Singapore as the system was able to 
handle various sophisticated levels of 
agent and corporate bookings and 
requests. 
Furthermore, the company was 
also able to handle more complicated 
itineraries to improve their per diems 
(a common industry term that refers 
to the amount paid per passenger per 
night). This would include offering a 
series of cruises-to-nowhere to two 
geographical segments of the 
Malaysian market. Asiatic cruises to 
nowhere were available out of 
Penang (a port in the northern part of 
Malaysia) as well as Port Klang (the 
main port of Malaysia, some fifty 
kilometers out of the capital, Kuala 
Lumpur). Planning the ship’s itinerary 
such that she called into Penang on 
alternate weeks to do a series of 
overnight cruises and cruises to 
Phuket (in Thailand), Asiatic had the 
benefit of a more diversified portfolio 
by having a domestic market 
consisting of two geographical 
markets that had the highest 
population density in Malaysia. Also, 
since the vessel called at 3 ports it 
aimed to have a more stable itinerary 
that could be marketed on a long-
term basis to foreign tourists. 
In 1995, Asiatic had five main 
cruise products. The cruise-to-
nowhere from Port Klang, one way 
cruise from Port Klang to Penang 
(frequently termed as the positioning 
cruises since the vessel was being 
positioned in Penang to serve that 
market), Penang to Phuket (with 
return) cruise, cruise-to-nowhere from 
Penang, and the positioning cruises 
from Penang back to Port Klang. A 
typical week’s itinerary for the vessel 
can be seen from Table 1 below. 
From this itinerary, Asiatic also sold 
cruises from Port Klang to Phuket and 
Penang, but passengers would need 
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to disembark at Penang instead, 
since the vessel would take in one or 
two more overnight cruises before 
returning to Port Klang. 
< Take in Table 1 here> 
<Take in Figure 1 here> 
Positioning cruises were 
difficult to sell in the Malaysian 
markets, because the passenger 
would have to make alternative 
arrangements to return (i.e. by rail or 
by flight). Since the positioning 
cruises were only one night in 
duration, many passengers 
considered the duration to be too 
short to go through the trouble of 
making alternative arrangements of 
returning. Yet, Asiatic was not 
prepared to give up either Penang or 
Port Klang markets by having the 
vessel permanently sailing on 
itineraries from only one homeport 
since having twin markets offered 
greater stability and better loads. 
Often, the positioning cruises would 
only have some twenty passengers 
on board. There was tremendous 
excess capacity and a solution had to 
be obtained soon. 
In late 1994, Asiatic embarked 
on an ambitious program to market 
the positioning cruises, not to its 
primary market of Malaysia, but to 
other Asian markets of Japan, 
Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and 
Thailand. In partnership with 
Malaysian Airlines (the national flight 
carrier of Malaysia), Creative Tours 
(Ho’s own company) and a few 
hotels, they launched the first Fly-
Cruise-Tour (FCT) in the region. 
Twenty-five tour operators were 
invited, on a complimentary basis, to 
fly to Malaysia, tour Kuala Lumpur 
(the capital of Malaysia), cruise to 
Penang on the vessel (one way) and 
tour Penang before returning to their 
original destination. This invitation 
served not only to introduce “The 
Asian Princess” to some of the top 
tour operators in these countries but 
also to allow them to go through 
exactly the fly-cruise-tour itineraries 
as their passengers would, if the 
program were adopted and sold in 
their home country.  
However, despite aggressive 
attempts on the part of the company, 
selling the cruises to these new 
external markets were slow. The 
external markets were many in 
numbers, geographically far apart, 
and above all, uneducated about 
going on a cruise. There was a need 
to develop channel contracts such 
that the cruises can be marketed 
effectively within these markets. 
However, the agents were only 
prepared to promote the cruises if 
Asiatic was willing to fund travel agent 
training, consumer education and 
marketing. With limited resources, 
Asiatic had to be selective in the 
market it chose to develop. 
Furthermore, there was no guarantee 
that the external agent would be 
committed to aggressively promote 
the cruises once the funds have been 
spent. The fear of opportunistic 
behavior is once again prevalent. 
Nevertheless, determined to 
accelerate its market penetration 
efforts overseas, Asiatic attempted to 
establish a channel contract with 
TourAsia, an Australian travel agent 
and tour operator. 
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THE CONTRACT 
The fundamental nature of a 
contract is to progress beyond mere 
promises in such a way that parties 
entering into a contract would hope to 
reduce any mutual inclination towards 
opportunism (Masten, 1996). Since 
both parties did not wish to waste 
their time on contracts that were of 
little use, transaction cost issues were 
kept on the forefront of negotiations 
and both sides were determined to 
obtain a solution. 
The Australian market was first 
introduced to Asiatic by Ben Tan, the 
managing director of TourAsia, a 
large tour operator based in 
Melbourne, Australia, which 
specialized in tours to Asia. The 
Australian market was attractive to 
Asiatic because it had a large 
population of retirees that were 
affluent. As this segment of the 
market had both the time and the 
money to go cruising, they were 
considered the ideal market to tap 
into.  
In addition, the Australian 
market was very attracted to the 
destinations of Penang and Phuket. 
The idea was to sell the positioning 
cruise of Port Klang-Penang-Phuket 
through a fly-cruise-tour program 
illustrated in Table 2. 
<< Take in Table 2 >> 
 
Ensuring partner suitability  
In light of past experiences 
with overseas tour operators, Asiatic 
was cautious in dealing with 
TourAsia. They conducted an 
extensive study into TourAsia’s 
markets, its current market position 
amongst tour operators in Australia 
and the ability of the company to 
aggressively promote and sell 
cruising in Asia to the Australian 
market. Asiatic was particularly 
impressed with TourAsia’s network of 
agents selling their programs, as well 
as the sophisticated reservation 
system TourAsia possessed that 
allowed them to handle all bookings 
on their programs. In addition, 
TourAsia had a track record of 
successfully introducing new and 
innovative tourism products to the 
Australian market. Such a reputation 
gave Asiatic some assurance on the 
suitability of TourAsia as a partner 
since the long-run building of the 
relationship would be more beneficial 
than the short-term gains from taking 
advantage of a contracting partner 
(see Telser, 1980). 
Credible Commitments 
From the viewpoint of the 
Australian market, Asiatic Cruises 
offered a completely new product. 
Going to Asia for a cruise was not a 
well-known idea in Australia and 
funds were required to educate the 
market. In this regard, Asiatic was 
faced with a few problems. Although it 
had some funds to spend on external 
markets, Asiatic was also keen to 
penetrate other markets besides 
Australia and did not want to spend 
too much into a single market.  
To develop the market, 
TourAsia estimated that 
AUD$140,000 was required over the 
first year. A complete 1996 sales and 
marketing plan to market Asiatic 
cruises nationwide was proposed and 
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accepted by Asiatic. This would 
include consumer advertisements, 
product and sales training of front line 
staff, fax broadcasts, promotions and 
a host of other marketing activities. 
TourAsia proposed that the plan 
should be jointly funded by both 
companies on an equivalent basis. 
However, from Asiatic’s point of view, 
they could at most, allocate only 
AUD$20,000 for the Australian 
market.  
Additionally, Asiatic also felt 
that if they actually expended the 
funds to develop the market, other 
cruise lines would take the 
opportunity to enter the market, once 
it was developed, by appointing 
TourAsia as their agent.  
From TourAsia’s perspective, 
they were reluctant to fund the whole 
marketing exercise, as they were of 
the opinion that Asiatic was the prime 
beneficiary. A compromise was 
developed on a 60% (AUD$84,000) - 
40% (AUD$56,000) basis where 
Asiatic would fund the higher portion. 
To accommodate Asiatic’s resource 
constraints, it was agreed that 
TourAsia would fund AUS$120,000 
up front for the marketing exercise 
with Asiatic contributing AUD$20,000 
cash. To recover Asiatic’s balance 
share of the funds (AUD$64,000), 
TourAsia would have to actually sell 
the cruises and recover the balance 
from a percentage of the cruise sales 
sold over the entire year. Since 
TourAsia’s forecasted number of 
passengers was approximately 5,000 
with a minimum cruise of 2 nights per 
passenger, TourAsia could only 
recover the full amount of Asiatic’s 
share over the contract duration of 
one year, if it were able to fulfill its 
target. Otherwise, the deductions 
would continue until the amounts 
were fully recovered. There was no 
penalty on non-fulfillment of target 
since it was a new market and the 
forecasts were also uncertain.  
To provide the assurance to 
TourAsia that the cruises sold would 
be available, Asiatic consented to 
contract on a fixed price basis and 
pledged a fixed capacity so that 
TourAsia would have a ‘free-sale’ 
benefit (a free-sale is an industry term 
to mean that an agent can confirm a 
seat/room without referring back to 
the principal for confirmation on price 
and capacity availability). This pledge 
provided the agent with a guaranteed 
allotment of cabins. Finally, the 
contract would hand TourAsia total 
exclusivity to the Australian market. 
The contract feature of up-front 
funding by the agent resolved a few 
issues, those relating to potential 
opportunism arising from the 
intangibility and the inseparability of 
the service. Whilst TourAsia still did 
not hold inventory, Asiatic would have 
had a credible commitment from the 
agent, since TourAsia would be 
investing in some relationship-specific 
assets in the form of funding the 
marketing exercise. Specific assets 
are idiosyncratic investments that are 
specifically designed such that re-
deploying their use to alternative 
partners in the contract would render 
them almost valueless (Bello and 
Lohtia, 1995; Williamson, 1985). Such 
is the case for the marketing 
expenditure proposed by TourAsia.  
However, TourAsia's 
investment in the specific assets is 
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only partial. To ensure that there is no 
reverse-opportunism, Asiatic would 
have to sink in its share of the 
marketing exercise. However, taking 
into consideration the resource 
limitation of Asiatic, Asiatic's share 
was partially advanced by TourAsia. 
This advance was made possible by 
the fact that the capacity of the 
cruises has been, in effect sold, 
through an advanced pledge. 
Through advanced sale, Asiatic was 
able to augment its resources. In 
addition, since TourAsia's recovery of 
the advance is progressive over the 
contract duration as sales materialize, 
it would have an incentive to 
aggressively promote the cruises, so 
as to ensure an earlier retrieval of the 
marketing funds.  
Also, a prominent feature in 
the contract between Asiatic and 
TourAsia is the fact that a portion of 
the cruise capacity was used as a 
pledge. Anderson and Weitz (1992) 
defined pledges as "actions 
undertaken by channel members that 
demonstrate good faith and bind the 
channel members to the relationship. 
Pledges are more than simple 
declarations of commitments or 
promises to act in good faith. They 
are specific actions binding a channel 
member to a relationship." 
The contract between Asiatic 
and TourAsia used the capacity of the 
positioning cruises as a form of a 
pledge. This was of paramount 
importance to TourAsia to counter the 
threat of potential opportunistic 
behavior by Asiatic and to ensure the 
return of the advances. Such a 
pledge was given to TourAsia in 
exchange for TourAsia’s commitment 
of expending the marketing funds into 
the market to promote the Asiatic’s 
cruises. With the pledge, TourAsia 
could be more assured of Asiatic’s 
commitment to their market. Asiatic, 
on the other hand, gained the 
assurance of the agent’s investment.  
Accordingly, rather than focus 
the firm’s effort on reducing potential 
opportunism, the focus of both cruise 
line and agent is now convergent and 
both have an incentive to work 
towards a joint surplus maximizing 
behavior of developing the market to 
its full potential. 
 
Formalization to control excess 
capacity 
Asiatic also introduced further 
safeguards, such as formalization1 
procedures, which dictate the date 
when the capacity pledged to 
TourAsia would be released back to 
Asiatic within a 'cut-off period' (i.e. the 
number of days before a service is to 
be performed). With formalization, 
transacting parties are more assured 
of each other's behavior and such 
predictability fosters the relationship. 
Research has shown that 
formalization procedures reduce 
opportunism and increase the 
effectiveness of the relationship 
(Dahlstrom et. al., 1995).  
In this contract, the 
formalization procedures dictated the 
cut off date of two (2) months before 
a cruise when the pledged capacity 
was released back to the cruise line. 
Since the Australian market often 
confirmed their travel arrangements 
more than two months before the 
onset of travel, such an imposition 
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created no problems to TourAsia. By 
doing so, Asiatic was able to put other 
potential customers on a waiting list 
and confirmed them with the capacity 
released by TourAsia, if they were 
unable to fill their capacity by the cut 
off dates. Consequently, even though 
pledging capacity without a guarantee 
of sale may risk potential excess 
capacity, wait-listing potential 
customers (and agents) who would 
purchase capacity released after cut 
off date would substantially reduce 
that risk while still giving Asiatic the 
benefits of the pledge.  
Finally, both Asiatic and 
TourAsia were aware that new market 
development entailed a great deal of 
uncertainty and complexities, through 
issues that the contract may not have 
provided for. Thus, the short contract 
duration served three purposes.  
First, it gave both parties the 
platform to develop the relationship 
such that the contract may become 
'relational' in character. When parties 
participate in a more relational 
contract, the process by which the 
exchange is facilitated is usually more 
flexible, with parties preserving the 
'spirit ' of the contract rather than the 
explicit terms (see Lusch and Brown, 
1996). Second, if the contract or the 
market does not work out, both would 
have shared the risk and would 
equally be able to walk out of the 
deal, wiser and without 
recriminations. Finally, should the 
market turn out better than expected, 
no party would be able to hold up the 
other as the contract would have to 
be re-negotiated. The benefits of the 
relationship specific assets would 
have only been useful during the 
contract duration. Consequently, 
Asiatic and TourAsia signed the 
contract in January 1996. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Normative services marketing 
literature treats the distribution of 
services as the distribution of service 
delivery, as opposed to the 
distribution of service sales (Lovelock, 
2000; Payne, 1993; Zeithaml & 
Bitner, 2000). This difference may not 
be as relevant in goods since it is 
assumed that the selling and 
distribution of a tangible good can 
occur at the same time. However, the 
same cannot be assumed for services 
for the following reasons.  
First, services often operate 
with a fixed short-term capacity (cf. 
Ng, Wirtz & Lee, 1999). This usually 
results in services being sold in 
advance (Ng, 2004; Lee & Ng, 2001; 
Shugan & Xie, 2000; Xie and Shugan, 
2001), as the consumers may wish to 
have the assurance that the service is 
available at the time they wish to 
consume it.2 There is therefore a 
meaningful time difference between 
selling and delivery. Furthermore, the 
selling of a service in advance may 
be through an agent or sold directly 
through a firm (e.g. travel agent as in 
this case). Since the service is not 
delivered at the time of the sale, the 
sale is essentially the sale of a 
promise that the service will be 
delivered at some future time. 
Complicating this promise is the fact 
that a service is perished immediately 
upon production and/or consumption 
and the consumer would not be able 
to obtain the same service again.3 
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The advanced sale of the service 
therefore has serious transaction cost 
implications to the firm and a potential 
intermediary.  
This paper highlights various 
practical and theoretical issues that 
can potentially thwart the 
development of a service channel 
contract. It showed that service 
intermediaries are not able to take 
inventory and is therefore unable to 
demonstrate their commitment. 
Consequently, both parties would be 
unwilling to establish a contract. This 
result is consistent with the findings of 
Brouthers and Brouthers (2003). In 
their study, they showed that service 
firms making high asset specific 
investments preferred wholly owned 
modes of entry (as opposed to having 
an intermediary).  
However, this study 
demonstrates that commitment can 
be achieved through the intermediary 
investing in relationship-specific 
assets, such as marketing and 
promotional funds, that could be 
recoverable, subject to performance. 
In other words, the investment of 
such assets by the intermediary 
provides two benefits.  First, it 
provides the service firm with a 
credible commitment from the 
intermediary. Second, if the monetary 
value of the assets can be recovered 
progressively through sales, and 
within the contract duration, the 
intermediary would not be at risk from 
the service firm’s potential 
opportunism since the recovery is in 
the former’s full control. It also 
provides an incentive for the 
intermediary to be more aggressive in 
selling and obtaining an earlier 
recovery of its funds. As for the 
service firm, the intermediary’s 
recovery of the specific assets serves 
also as a fulfillment of its obligations 
under its contract.  
This study also contributes to 
academic literature in this area 
through the analysis of the 
deliberation process that took place in 
the institution of the contract. Our 
findings suggest that there is often 
more than meets the eye when 
analyzing written contracts and the 
analysis of written agreements should 
not be to the neglect of rich and 
insightful data that could be obtained 
from the deliberation process.  
This case also uncovers an 
interesting aspect of service firm’s 
ability to realize greater resources 
through advanced selling. Since a 
service firm faces capacity constraint, 
the threat of denying the intermediary 
the cruise at the time of consumption 
is real and credible. Furthermore, the 
cruise that departs at that point in 
time is no longer saleable. The agent 
therefore loses any opportunity to 
obtain revenue from a sale. With a 
credible threat of capacity 
unavailability, there is a real value 
attached to buying the service in 
advance for the agent. This results in 
an augmentation of the service firm’s 
resources for specific asset 
investments in the channel. However, 
to provide the intermediary the 
assurance that it will not behave 
opportunistically, the service firm has 
not only to invest in specific assets 
but also to pledge its capacity to the 
intermediary.  
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CONCLUSION 
The topic of sales channels in 
advance for service firms warrants 
research attention. There is currently 
very little research in this area. Even 
literature that investigates advanced 
selling have not yet delved into 
advanced channels. Furthermore, 
advanced selling literature in services 
is often in the form of theoretical 
models. Empirical studies on this 
phenomenon is still largely absent. 
This paper aims to illustrate service-
specific issues in the establishment of 
advanced selling channels for 
services through a case study. It 
hopes that the present study could 
stimulate greater research in this 
area. 
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Endnotes 
 
[1] Formalization is the extent to 
which explicit rules and procedures 
regulate the behavior of the firms 
involved in the relationship (Dwyer 
and Oh, 1987). 
 
[2] The fact that services are 
inseparable between production and 
consumption and perished 
immediately after would also mean 
that all services are technically sold in 
advance, even if it is a mere minutes 
in advance before consumption. 
 
[3] Services are usually valued 
because it is required at a particular 
time e.g. a flight or a hotel room. 
Changing the time of consumption 
would alter the benefit and therefore 
the value to the customer. 
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Table 1 
 
Day Port 
Sunday Port Klang (PKL) 
Monday Penang (PEN) 
Tuesday Phuket (HKT) 
Wednesday Penang  
Thursday Penang 
Friday Penang  
(Port Klang)* 
Saturday Port Klang 
 
* Occasionally the vessel returns to Port Klang on Friday instead of Saturday 
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Table 2 
Typical Fly-Cruise-Tour Itinerary for the Australian Market 
 
Day 1 
AM: Fly Australia - Kuala Lumpur 
PM: Day Excursion. Board “The Asian Princess” for a cruise to Penang 
Day 2 
AM: Arrive Penang. Shore Excursion in Penang.  
PM: Return to ship in evening. Cruise to Phuket. 
Day 3 
AM: Arrive Phuket. Disembark. Check in to Phuket hotel. 
PM: At leisure 
Day 4 – 10 
At leisure/Tour of Phuket Island 
Day 11 
PM: Board the Asian Princess. Cruise to Penang 
Day 12 
AM: Arrive Penang. Transfer to Airport Flight back to Australia. 
(Extensions of stay are possible) 
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Figure 1: Map of Cruise Routes 
 
 
 
